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Abstract 
Using a search theoretical model, we analyse the effects of the information flow via 
social networks (friends, relatives and other personal contacts) by comparing mone-
tary and non-monetary outcomes in obtaining jobs via networks versus formal meth-
ods. Propensity-score matching on survey data from the low-skilled unemployed is 
used to identify causal effects. The analysis takes into account unobserved hetero-
geneity by applying Rosenbaum bounds. Because of the potential ambiguity when 
comparing outcomes in accepted jobs, we also examine the effectiveness of job 
searches using social networks as a source of information compared to not using 
networks. We find no evidence for causal effects on monetary outcomes and, at 
best, only weak evidence for effects on non-monetary job outcomes. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Ausgehend von einem suchtheoretischen  Modell  analysieren  wir  die Effekte des 
Informationsflusses über soziale Netzwerke auf dem Arbeitsmarkt indem wir mone-
täre und nicht-monetäre Erträge aus Beschäftigung vergleichen, die über soziale 
Netzwerke und formale Wege gefunden wurden. Um kausale Effekte zu identifizie-
ren wenden wir Propensity-Score-Matching auf Erhebungsdaten für geringqualifi-
zierte Arbeitslose an. Mit Hilfe von Rosenbaum-Bounds können wir unbeobachtete 
Heterogenität in der Analyse berücksichtigen. Da der Vergleich nach Methode  der 
Job-Findung irreführend sein kann, untersuchen wir auch den Effekt der reinen Job-
suche über soziale Netzwerke, unabhängig von der Methode der Job-Findung. Die 
Analyse zeigt keine Effekte sozialer Netzwerke für monetäre Erträge aus Beschäfti-
gung  und im besten Fall sehr schwache Hinweise auf kausale Effekte für nicht-
monetäre Erträge. 
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1  Introduction 
As has been proposed, for example, by Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1974), many 
jobs are found through contacting social networks, i.e., asking friends, relatives and 
other personal contacts. Because job searches can be costly, both in terms of finan-
cial resources and time, job seekers may access their social network to receive bet-
ter and faster information compared to more “formal” search strategies such as rep-
lying to employment ads or using public or private employment services. In the lite-
rature, the faster information flow within social networks and the higher quality of 
information provided is expected to result in both faster transitions into new jobs and 
transitions into better jobs (Granovetter  1974, 1995). However, the empirical re-
search provides mixed evidence for the effect of using social networks on the quality 
of jobs obtained. Some papers report positive effects, such as increased wages or 
job satisfaction, whereas others report no or even negative effects (for overviews 
see Mouw 2003; Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004; Granovetter 1995). 
In this paper, we analyse the effect of social networks on the returns to job search. 
Following a search theoretical analysis proposed by Montgomery (1992) and ex-
tended by Franzen and Hangartner (2006), we distinguish between two theoretical 
mechanisms, one for monetary and one for non-monetary job outcomes. We add to 
the existing literature in three important regards. First, using propensity score match-
ing, we show that for the low-skilled job seekers, there seems to be positive returns 
to job searches via networks, albeit not on wages but on non-monetary characteris-
tics. Second, we show that these positive effects on both job satisfaction and on the 
probability of obtaining a permanent employment contract might be explained by 
unobserved heterogeneity, a problem common to estimating the causal effects of 
networks from cross-sectional data (Mouw 2003, 2006). Using Rosenbaum bounds, 
we show that even a low level of unobserved heterogeneity is sufficient to cast 
doubt on the causal interpretation of significant differences between jobs found via 
networks and jobs found by other means. Third, from Montgomery´s model (1992), 
we derive the proposition that not only obtaining a job via networks, but also merely 
engaging in job searches via networks, can raise (reservation) wages and therefore 
influence monetary returns to the job search. Testing this implication using propensi-
ty score matching, however, indicates no such effect on either monetary or non-
monetary outcomes. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we discuss two mechanisms for mone-
tary and non-monetary job search outcomes and derive our hypotheses. The data 
and the methods used to test our hypotheses are presented in Section 3. Section 
3.1 describes the data, and Section 3.2 introduces propensity score matching as a 
method for estimating the causal effect of networks on job outcomes. We also show 
how propensity score matching can be used to evaluate the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity on these estimates. In Section 4, we present our empirical analysis; 
we first discuss the success of the propensity score matching in eliminating the in-
fluence of all observed covariates (Section 4.1), and then we present estimated 
causal effects of job searches through social networks and discuss their sensitivity IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  6 
to unobserved covariates and different operationalisations of the theoretical concept 
“search through social networks” (Section 4.2). In Section 5, we present our conclu-
sions. 
2  Theoretical Mechanisms and Hypotheses 
To analyse the returns to the job search strategy, we rely on Montgomery`s (1992) 
re-formulation of Granovetter’s (1974) seminal thesis in terms of sequential job 
search theory
1 (for an overview regarding search theory, see Rogerson et al. 2005). 
The theory assumes that in every search period, a job seeker has to decide whether 
to accept or to refuse a job offer, if such a job offer is received at all. A job seeker 
will make this decision based on her reservation wage, meaning that she will only 
accept a job where the respective wage offer exceeds a certain threshold. If a job 
offer is not accepted, the job seeker continues searching. Job offers are received 
during a search period with a certain probability. This probability, or job offer arrival 
rate, depends upon various characteristics of the job seeker, e.g., the level of hu-
man capital. It might also depend on the search methods used by the individual. In 
Montgomery`s search theoretical model, the influence of two different job search 
methods mainly depend on a) whether the job offer arrival rates and b) the wage 
offer distribution differ for each method (e.g., Mouw 2003: 873 f). 
The Granovetter version of Montgomery`s theoretical model assumes that social 
networks relay more job offers per search period (i.e., the job offer probability is 
higher) than do formal job search methods but that the wage distributions are equal 
for both methods (for empirical evidence supporting this assumption, see Koning 
et al. 1997). However, comparing the wages for the jobs that were located via net-
works and the jobs that were located through formal search methods might not be 
as straightforward as one would expect. Montgomery (1992) points out that if a job 
seeker has located her current job via formal methods, this does not exclude the 
possibility that additional job offers from her social network could have increased her 
reservation wage. Suppose that all or most job seekers use both formal searches 
and their social networks to collect information, and suppose that the use of person-
al contacts in a job search increases the probability of receiving a job offer in a given 
period. To understand the implications of this model, let us consider an extreme 
example
2. We assume that in a given search period, an individual almost always 
receives a job offer through personal contacts (job offer rate close to 1) and almost 
never receives a job offer through formal search methods (job offer rate close to 0). 
As Montgomery explains, this situation can lead to a seemingly counter-intuitive 
empirical result: 
“In the period in which an offer is accepted, an individual accepting a job through a 
[formal method] is thus likely to have received two offers. An individual accepting a 
                                                  
1   Montgomery uses a sequential job search model, but similar predictions can be derived 
from an extensive job search model (Mouw 2003: Appendices A and B) as well. 
2   This example is adapted from Montgomery 1992: 590. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  7 
job through a [personal contact], on the other hand, is likely to have received only 
one offer. Because the expected highest offer increases as the number of offers 
rises, the use of a [personal contact] implies a lower expected wage” (Montgomery 
1992: 590). 
Franzen and Hangartner (2006) extended Montgomery`s work with regard to non-
monetary job search outcomes. In addition to the wage distribution, they assume the 
existence of what they call “job adequacy distribution.” This distribution is different 
for jobs located via formal versus network searches. This difference occurs because 
network contacts have better information on specific job characteristics that is inac-
cessible through a formal search (e.g., workload and colleagues) as well as better 
information on the preferences of the job seeker. Network contacts can filter poten-
tial vacancies with regard to the job seeker`s preferences and the working condi-
tions associated with the respective employer. Thus, formally, the job adequacy dis-
tribution of network jobs second-order stochastically dominates the distribution of 
jobs found through formal search methods. In this case, expected outcomes regard-
ing the non-monetary aspects of jobs will be higher for network jobs than for jobs 
found via formal search channels (c.f. Montgomery 1992: 592)
3. 
In this analysis, we will focus on a specific population, namely, on low qualified 
and/or long-term, unemployed job seekers. In addition to the obvious characteristic 
of having lower levels of human capital, this group might be different from other 
populations in regards to the type of social network in which they are embedded. 
One major difference is that the social network of unemployed job seekers might 
contain a relatively low number of employed persons. This situation presents a dis-
advantage  because employed contacts are a major source of information in job 
searches (cf. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004). If the unemployed are, to some 
extent, cut off from this source, there are fewer advantages to using their social net-
work for a job search. However, a less effective network is not automatically an inef-
fective network. Whether using one`s social network for a job search is effective for 
the low qualified and/or long-term unemployed compared to using formal methods is 
an open question and, as such, subject to the empirical analysis presented below. 
Therefore, in the population of low-skilled unemployed job seekers, the same two 
theoretical mechanisms can be assumed to be at work. 
                                                  
3  In their empirical analysis, Franzen and Hangartner (2006) focus on university graduates. 
Regarding the effects on non-monetary outcomes, they find positive effects for several 
indicators of job adequacy, which they see as an indication for the positive effect of the 
networks on non-monetary outcomes. For monetary outcomes, their results indicate that 
jobs found through social networks pay, on average, approximately 5 percent less than 
jobs found by other means. According to our interpretation of the Montgomery 1992 
model, this percentage difference can be seen - in combination with Franzen and Han-
gartner´s assumptions - as an indication of a positive effect for searches via social net-
works. In contrast, even if Franzen and Hangartner (2006: 363) do interpret this negative 
difference to be consistent with the Montgomery model, they also state that “searching 
via social contacts has no monetary advantage” (Franzen and Hangartner 2006: 361). IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  8 
Mechanism one, which Montgomery attributes to Granovetter (1974), states that a 
job search via social networks leads to faster information flow, i.e., more job offers 
per search period. However, even if offers arrive more quickly through social net-
works, the wages attached to these offers do not differ from those offers obtained 
through formal search methods. If a positive effect on the job offer arrival rate and, 
ultimately, on wages truly exists, in terms of empirical estimation, this effect implies 
that we should observe the seemingly paradoxical situation of lower wages in jobs 
located through networks. Our first hypothesis, therefore, is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The use of social networks in a job search has a positive effect on 
wages, (paradoxically) indicated by the lower wages in jobs found via social net-
works. 
Mechanism two states that a job search via social networks leads to better informa-
tion regarding the non-monetary aspects of a job, i.e., it accesses more detailed, 
broader and more precise information that is not accessible via formal search chan-
nels. Consequently, the average job quality of jobs found through networks is higher 
than it is for jobs found through other means, leading us to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The use of social networks in a job search has a positive effect on job 
quality, indicated by the higher job quality of jobs found via social networks. 
What could make interpreting our empirical results difficult is that these hypotheses 
are grounded on very specific assumptions regarding (unobservable) wage and job 
quality distributions. As Montgomery (1992) notes, the expected sign when compar-
ing wages (or other post-hiring job outcomes) for jobs found via both search me-
thods depends on these assumptions, i.e., do formal and network search access the 
same wage distributions, and what is the form of these distributions (e.g., normal or 
lognormal) (e.g., Mouw 2003: 891)? For example, we could follow Lin (1982), (cf. 
Montgomery 1992: 586) and argue that the wage distribution for both search me-
thods differs, with wages for jobs located through social networks being, on average, 
higher. Then, a positive effect of social networks on wages would correspond to a 
positive wage differential (see Montgomery 1992: 592). Additionally, if, empirically, 
there is only one job offer in each search period, a near-zero wage differential is 
also consistent with a positive effect on the information flow (see Montgomery 1992: 
590). Therefore, finding results that are inconsistent with our theoretical prediction 
might either mean that social networks have no effect on job search outcome or that 
there is an effect, but our theoretical model is based on empirically unsupported 
assumptions. 
Because of this ambiguity, Mouw (2003) generally believes that in cross-sectional 
data, “comparing the wages of accepted job offers is a misleading way to determine 
the effectiveness of job search methods if workers use multiple methods of job 
search” (Mouw 2003: 870). Following Montgomery`s advice (1992: 593), he argues 
that for social networks to have a causal effect on wages, two conditions should 
hold: a specific indicator of network structure (e.g., network size) should be positive-
ly correlated with the probability that the accepted job was found via personal con-IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  9 
tacts and, at the same time, should be positively correlated with the wages for this 
accepted job. Because no viable network characteristics are available in our data, 
we propose a different way to manage this problem. We argue that in addition to 
comparing wages in jobs found via social networks versus formal methods, a 
second comparison can be made that is not subject to the above ambiguity. We 
therefore compare wages for individuals who used networks as a job search strate-
gy with those who did not use it, irrespective of how the current job was ultimately 
located. In this case, any positive effect on the job offer arrival rate (mechanism one) 
or the information quality (mechanism two) should be confined to the group of net-
work searchers. With this focus on job searches, we circumvent the problem that the 
job finding method might be endogenous using Montgomery’s (1992) definition. 
3  Data and Methods 
3.1  Data 
In many population surveys, the number of low-skilled unemployed job seekers is 
low, with the additional problem that this is particularly true for the subset of low-
skilled unemployed that successfully re-enter employment. In the following analysis, 
we use survey data that were originally collected to evaluate the success of a pilot 
project regarding in-work benefits in Germany (Krug 2009, 2010). This survey fo-
cuses specifically on low-skilled or long-term unemployed workers that re-entered 
employment. Interviews were conducted with formerly unemployed persons that 
started work with or without a benefit between January 2001 and August 2002 (re-
gional pilot project phase) and between September 2002 and March 2003 (nation-
wide implementation). For our analysis, we focus on the subsample of approxi-
mately 1100 low-skilled and/or long-term unemployed individuals. 
Another advantage of this survey is that it contains a variety of information on the 
persons re-entering employment, ranging from objective data on socio-demographic 
characteristics, employment history, household context, and individual and house-
hold income, to subjective information on attitudes about life and employment as 
well as job satisfaction. The survey includes extensive information on job search 
behaviour during unemployment and information on how the accepted job was 
found. However, one of the downsides of the survey is that because it was not in-
tended to analyse network effects, we have to limit the scope of our analysis to 
whether a person used networks to search for a job; we are unable to assess the 
effect of certain network characteristics. 
Because of the wide range of information, we can address several aspects regard-
ing the monetary and non-monetary returns to job search and can distinguish be-
tween objective and subjective indicators. For objective indicators for monetary re-
turns, we used the respondent’s monthly and hourly wages in euro. Because the 
interviews  were conducted early after leaving unemployment, the wages can be 
regarded as starting wages. Monthly wages will reflect whether a job is only part-
time, while hourly wages will indicate the expected productivity in the new job. As a 
subjective indicator, we used the question, "How satisfied have you been with your IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  10 
earnings?" measured on a four-point scale, which we dichotomised to “not satisfied” 
and “satisfied.” To analyse the effect of the networks on non-monetary returns, we 
used questions on general job satisfaction and task satisfaction as subjective indica-
tors (again dichotomised to "not satisfied" and "satisfied"). For more objective indica-
tors, we used information on whether the employment contract was fixed-term or 
permanent and information on the employment stability, where stability is measured 
by the right censored duration of the job and employment status at the time of the 
interview. 
3.2  The matching estimator for causal effects  
We use propensity score matching (PSM) to estimate the returns of a job search 
through social networks. For the following analysis, let  F net  be a dummy treatment 
indicator with  1 = F net  if the accepted job was found with the help of one`s network, 
and  0 = F net  if the job was found through other search channels. Furthermore, let 
jso be a variable representing monetary or non-monetary job search outcomes in 
the new job. Following Rubin’s Causal Model (RCM, see Rubin 1974; Holland 1986; 
Gangl 2010; Sobe 1995), two potential versions of the outcome variable have to be 
distinguished, depending on how the job was located: 
   



=
=
=
1 ,
0 ,
1
0
F
F
net if jso
net if jso
jso   (1) 
Within this framework, one important causal effect is the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT): 
  ) 1 | ( ) 1 | (
0 1 = − = = F F net jso E net jso E δ   (2) 
Equation 2 compares the expected outcome in treatment status (“network job”) for 
those who received the treatment with the so-called counterfactual, which is the ex-
pected outcome that the same persons would have experienced if they had not re-
ceived the treatment (“formally found job”). Outcome variables can be continuous 
(i.e., hourly wages), or they can be binary (i.e., job satisfaction). 
The counterfactual expectation in equation 2 can be replaced by a factual expecta-
tion of the job search outcomes for persons in jobs found through formal methods, 
given covariates x (Holland 1986): 
  ( ) ) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | (
0 1 x x x = − = = F F net jso E net jso E E δ   (3) 
A nonparametric estimator for the causal effect under conditional mean independ-
ence is the matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985, 1983; Heckman et al. 
1998; Morgan and Harding 2006), which estimates the ATT by matching persons in 
a network job to persons in a formally found job with identical vectors of pre-
treatment covariates x. 
The matching estimator is given by a weighted difference in means, with  1 I  and  0 I  
indicating the persons in network jobs and regular jobs, respectively, and CS denot-IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  11 
ing the region of common support in the propensity score distributions of both 
groups: 
  ∑ ∑ ∑
∩ ∈ ∩ ∈ ∩ ∈
− =
CS I i CS I j
j
CS I i
i jso j i w
n
jso
n
1 0 1
0
1
1
1
) , (
1 1 ˆ δ
,
  (4) 
The number of individuals with network jobs within the region of common support is 
1 n  , and  ) , ( j i w  is the weight given to observation  j  when matched to observation 
i  . Depending on the choice of  ) , ( j i w , different versions of the matching estimators 
can be constructed. We use single-nearest neighbour matching (SNNM) without 
replacement, i.e., observation  j  is chosen as a match for observation i  when  j  is 
closest to i  in terms of the absolute distance of propensity scores  | ) ( ) ( | j i P P x x − . 
This algorithm is chosen because the sensitivity analysis (see below) is only possi-
ble when using SNNM. 
To avoid any matches where  ) ( j P x  is both the nearest neighbour and very far from 
) ( i P x , a maximum level of acceptable distance (calliper) has to be set. Because the 
covariates are balanced nonparametrically, a weighted difference in means gives 
the causal effect of networks on the job search outcomes that are measured as 
dummy or continuous variables. If the outcome variable is a function of time, as is 
the case when analysing employment stability, then we can combine the appropriate 
event history analysis - here, for example, a Cox regression - with the matching ap-
proach (Rubin 1973; Hujer et al. 1998; Ho et al. 2007). This combination is achieved 
by performing the regression using observations within the CS only, where  ) (t k λ
denotes the hazard function for individual k , t denotes the time in employment, and 
) (t a denotes the baseline hazard: 
  ) exp( ) ( ) ( β γ α λ k k F k net t t x + = ,  CS k ∈ ,  (5) 
The covariates and the treatment indicator,net , are included as independent vari-
ables, and  ) exp(γ gives the effect of the networks on employment stability in the 
form of a hazard ratio. 
Note that the problem of unobserved heterogeneity arises if the influential variables 
cannot be included in the vector of the covariates x. For example, an unobserved 
variable such as ability might influence wages and is simultaneously correlated with 
the chances of finding a job through networks. This correlation could be due to ho-
mophily (McPherson et al. 2001), where high-ability job seekers have a network 
consisting of high-ability persons, who in turn refer higher-wage jobs. If longitudinal 
data are available, such unobserved fixed confounders can be taken into account by 
applying a panel fixed-effect estimator (e.g., Mouw  2006). Because  only cross-
sectional data are available to us, as an alternative, we perform a sensitivity analysis 
based on propensity score matching. Although a PSM on cross-sectional data can-
not directly control for unobserved heterogeneity, it allows us to perform a sensitivity IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  12 
analysis to determine how strong the influence of any unobserved variables must be 
to cast doubt on the causal interpretation of network effects. The sensitivity analysis 
assumes that there is a relevant, unobserved confounder u that should have been 
included in the estimation of the propensity score ( 1 = u for high-ability persons, 
0 = u for low-ability persons): 
  ( )
1 ) ( exp( 1 ) , | 1 ( ) (
− + ′ − + = = = i i i i F i u u net P x P η β x x   (6) 
Using a method developed by Rosenbaum (2002), we can vary the influence of this 
hypothetical variable (represented by the odds ratio (OR) 
η e , where η  is the respec-
tive coefficient), and determine whether any estimated effects are still significant. 
This test is a “worst-case scenario” (DiPrete and Gangl 2004: 15) because an unob-
served relevant confounder u may not really exist, and the test assumes that the 
unobserved confounder leads to better job outcomes for every matched pair. How-
ever, the sensitivity test provides a good idea of how robust the results are with re-
spect to any unobserved heterogeneity. 
Because analysing differences in the wages for accepted jobs located with and 
without networks (treatment indicator  F net ) can lead to ambiguous results (see the 
discussion in Section 2), we supplement our analysis by estimating the effect of an 
alternative treatment indicator,  S net . The indicator equals one ( 1 = S net ) for job 
seekers that use networks as one of their search strategies (irrespective of how the 
job was eventually found) and  0 = S net for job seekers that do not use networks 
(irrespective of how the job was eventually found). 
4  Empirical Analysis 
4.1  Estimating the propensity score 
To ensure conditional independence, the logistic regression that estimates the pro-
pensity must include all relevant covariates. Contrary to regression analysis, we 
must focus only on those factors that are simultaneously correlated with the prob-
ability of taking a job found through networks and with the respective monetary or 
non-monetary labour market outcome. Factors that influence only labour market 
outcomes are not necessary to ensure unbiased estimation, but they can enhance 
the precision of the estimates. Additionally, factors that are only weakly correlated 
with either the treatment or the outcome should be excluded because they have 
limited use in reducing bias and can inflate the variance of the estimator (Imbens 
2004). 
To control for all necessary covariates, we identify three types of factors that are 
potentially important for finding a job through networks and for returns to job search. 
First, we control for differences in the job search behaviour between the two groups. 
How many search strategies and what different search strategies an unemployed 
person uses will influence whether, in the end, the accepted job comes from her 
social network, and these strategies will also influence (reservation) wages through IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  13 
the number of alternative job offers received during a search period. We also control 
for overall unemployment duration to account for a decline in reservation wages 
after longer periods of unemployment, and we control for any unemployment com-
pensation received during that time. We use the survey question of whether a re-
spondent turned down a low-wage job offer as an indicator of a high reservation 
wage. We control for whether the newly employed received an in-work benefit be-
cause the prospect of receiving such a wage subsidy might have an influence on 
reservation wages. 
Second, we take into account homophily in social network development. Homophily 
is the tendency of individuals to primarily interact with those who are similar to them. 
For example, well-qualified persons might have well-qualified friends. If well-
qualified friends are more helpful in locating an open position than are poorly quali-
fied friends, and well-qualified people receive higher average wages, irrespective of 
how the job was found, then this could result in a spurious correlation between 
wages and obtaining a job through networks. Because we do not have information 
on the characteristics of a person’s friends, we control for several key dimensions of 
homophily (e.g., McPherson et al. 2001). 
Third, we control for factors that influence the individual’s degree of access to social 
capital. The better the job seeker`s ability to access social capital is, the more likely 
she will find a job through social networks. We identify health limitations, family in-
come and employment-family structure as factors that could simultaneously influ-
ence one`s access to social capital and the possibility of realising high returns to job 
search (Boisjoly et al. 1995). We also include a dummy variable for East and West 
Germany to control for regional differences in the chances of finding a job. 
Table 1 shows the logistic regression using all of the available covariates. In 
Model 1, there are only a few covariates with significant effects on obtaining a job 
through networks (c.f., Lin 1999: 472, Fn2). Among all of the covariates, only job 
search behaviour has a significant effect on whether an accepted job was found 
through networks. Intuitively, the more search methods one uses, the less likely it is 
that the accepted job will be found through networks. Additionally, whether one ac-
tively uses networks as a search method has a high influence on whether the ac-
cepted job was found through networks. This statement is not tautological because 
there are also persons who did not search actively through networks, but the ob-
tained job was still referred to them by persons from their network. Other search 
channels do not influence the chances of obtaining a job through networks, except 
for “waiting for job offers from the employment agency.” Model 2 restricts the covari-
ates to those with a p-value lower than 0.6 because, similar to regression analysis, 
many irrelevant variables only inflate the standard errors of the matching estimator. 
A likelihood ratio test that compares Models 1 and 2 shows that the eliminated vari-
ables have no significant contribution. The estimation of the propensity score  is 
therefore based on Model 2. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  14 
Table 1 
Logistic regression to estimate the propensity score 
 
(1) Before 
Matching 
(2) Before 
Matching 
(3) After 
Matching 
(4) After 
Matching 
Full 
Model 
Restricted 
Model 
Restricted 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Job search behavior                         
Search effort (number of 
different search strate-
gies used)  0.645***  (0.095)  0.634***  (0.066)  1.100  (0.144)  1.226  (0.228) 
Job seeker placed ad in  
a newspaper  1244  (0.334)  1.276  (0.309)  0.935  (0.283)  0.832  (0.287) 
Asked friends, neighbors, 
relatives  4.689***  (1.418)  5.007***  -1381  1.090  (0.377)  0.941  (0.364) 
Asked caseworker in 
employment agency  1.171  (0.319)  1.157  (0.287)  0.981  (0.300)  0.884  (0.291) 
Computer search in  
database of employment 
agency  1.224  (0.339)  1.236  (0.299)  0.827  (0.255)  0.703  (0.248) 
Unsolicited application  1.344  (0.397)  1.368  (0.374)  0.935  (0.308)  0.849  (0.307) 
Waited for job offers from 
the employment agency  1.857***  (0.393)  1.977***  (0.348)  0.917  (0.204)  0.801  (0.216) 
Other search strategies  0.941  (0.215)          0.796  (0.233) 
Ever turned down em-
ployment offer because 
wage was too low? 
(Ref.: no, never)  0.871  (0.204)  0.891  (0.207)  0.896  (0.251)  0.868  (0.249) 
Unemployment duration  1.011  (0.009)  1.008  (0.009)  0.998  (0.011)  0.999  (0.011) 
Unemployment duration 
(squared)  1.000*  (0.000)  1.000*  (0.000)  1.000  (0.000)  1.000  (0.000) 
Unemployment compen-
sation before employ-
ment 
(Ref.: unemployment 
insurance)                  
Unemployment benefit  0.986  (0.203)  0.983  (0.196)  1.188  (0.295)  1.140  (0.297) 
No compensation  0.741  (0.184)  0.767  (0.184)  1.221  (0.371)  1.184  (0.375) 
Social benefits  0.687  (0.175)  0.729  (0.178)  1.108  (0.335)  1.030  (0.326) 
In-work benefit  
(Ref.: yes)  1.027  (0.179)          0.831  (0.180) 
                  
Dimensions of 
homophily                 
Born in Germany  (Ref.: 
yes)  1.081  (0.219)          1.105  (0.287) 
Sex  1.038  (0.182)          0.947  (0.212) 
Age  0.997  (0.014)          1.005  (0.018) 
Formal education  
 (none )                 
Lower secondary school  0.923  (0.263)          0.960  (0.350) 
Secondary school  1.120  (0.361)          1.107  (0.458) 
Intermediate school.  1.080  (0.315)          1.073  (0.396) 
Upper secondary school  1.057  (0.351)          0.818  (0.337) 
Formal qualification (R: 
none)                 
Skilled worker/technical 
training   0.985  (0.183)  0.958  (0.167)  0.815  (0.186)  0.852  (0.205) 
Vocational train-
ing/master 
craftsman/technician   0.772  (0.181)  0.777  (0.164)  0.828  (0.218)  0.900  (0.268) 
Job experience (years)  0.999  (0.014)          0.989  (0.017) 
Family important (yes)  1.031  (0.196)          0.932  (0.221) 
Leisure important (yes)  1.092  (0.183)          1.106  (0.233) 
Work important (yes)   1.000  (0.155)          1.055  (0.203) 
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Table 1 continued 
 
(1) Before 
Matching 
(2) Before 
Matching 
(3) After 
Matching 
(4) After 
Matching 
Full 
Model 
Restricted 
Model 
Restricted 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(stand. 
error) 
Access to social capital                 
Living with partner (mar-
ried or not married)  1.247  (0.238)  1.272  (0.234)  0.948  (0.216)  0.943  (0.225) 
Children in Household  0.910  (0.071)  0.916  (0.065)  1.031  (0.092)  0.994  (0.098) 
Net household income 
before employment  1.046  (0.038)  1.048  (0.037)  1.025  (0.046)  1.034  (0.048) 
Net household income 
before employment 
(squared)  0.999  (0.001)  0.999  (0.001)  0.999  (0.001)  0.999  (0.001) 
Health problems  
(Ref.: none)                 
Health problems without 
impact on employment 
chances  1.043  (0.283)          0.756  (0.240) 
Health problems with 
impact on employment 
chances  1.053  (0.281)          1.434  (0.530) 
West Germany (Ref.: 
yes)  1.184  (0.228)  1.113  (0.195)  0.970  (0.224)  0.942  (0.242) 
                  
Pseudo R2  0.0613    0.0598    0.0048    0.0116   
Prob > chi2  0.0001    0.0000    10000    10000   
N  1107    1119    524    520   
Likelihood ratio (LR)- Test of model 1 vs. model 2 (based on 1107 cases from model 1): LR chi2(15) = 1.99, 
Prob > chi2 =1.00; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Models 3 and 4 perform a simple multivariate test to determine whether matching 
eliminated the influence of the covariates. The test re-estimates Models 1 and 2 
after the propensity score matching took place. As observed in Model 3, all formerly 
significant covariates become insignificant. Additionally, Model 4 ensures that in the 
matched sample, the formerly irrelevant variables remain irrelevant. A more detailed 
analysis of the influence of covariates before and after the matching can be found in 
in the Appendix. In this Table, we show that after matching the persons in network 
and regular jobs, there are no significant bivariate differences in the means for any 
of the covariates used in the matching procedure. Having established the quality of 
our matching procedure, we can use the matched sample to estimate the causal 
effect of the networks on returns to job search. 
4.2  The causal effect of networks on returns to job search  
Table 2 reports the results from SNNM without replacement, with a very strict calli-
per of 0.005. First, let us consider the unadjusted differences in average job out-
comes between persons in network jobs and in regular jobs. Persons who obtained 
jobs through networks seem to have, on average, better job outcomes. Because the 
differences are measured before controlling for any covariates, that is, without con-
sidering differences in the composition of the job seekers, they are what a “naïve” 
observer might see when comparing network jobs with others. We see that jobs ob-
tained through networks tend to be characterised by a monthly wage of approxi-
mately 100 euro higher than other jobs; hourly wages are, on average, approxi-IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  16 
mately 80 eurocents higher. However, this difference in wages is not reflected by 
differences in wage satisfaction, which is approximately 5 percent, but is not statisti-
cally significant. 
Assuming the conditional independence assumption holds, the matching procedure 
eliminates all compositional differences between job seekers ending up in network 
or regular jobs. Differences in the means after the matching can therefore be inter-
preted as causal effects. From Table 2, we can see that the empirical evidence does 
not support our theoretically derived prediction of a negative difference. The mone-
tary returns point estimates basically remain positive after controlling for the covari-
ates, but they become smaller and statistically insignificant. Thus, we must conclude 
that there appears to be no causal effect of using networks on the monetary returns 
to job search. 
With regard to non-monetary outcomes before the matching, persons who located 
their job through networks tend to be more satisfied with their jobs and their specific 
job tasks. Additionally, persons who obtained their job through networks are signifi-
cantly more likely to be employed with a permanent contract, with a difference of 
approximately 16 percent. As is indicated by a hazard ratio well below 1, network 
jobs tend to be significantly more stable. 
Table 2 
Unadjusted differences and causal effects of networks on job search outcomes: 
job finding via networks (netF) 
  Before matching  After matching 
  Unadjusted 
difference 
Standard 
error 
Number of 
treated / 
controls 
Causal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
Number of 
treated / 
controls 
Hypothesis 1: Monetary outcome 
             
Monthly gross wages 
(euro)  99.28**  43.62  216 / 654  23.22  54.48  195 / 195 
Hourly gross wages 
(euro)  0.782*  0.442  215 / 652  0.738  0.722  194 / 194 
Satisfied with wage 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  0.053  0.034  285 / 834  0.008  0.044  262 / 262 
             
Hypothesis 2: Non-monetary outcomes 
             
Satisfied with job 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  0.077***  0.027  285 / 834  0.065**  0.032  262 / 262 
Satisfied with task 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  0.046*  0.028  285 / 834  0.023  0.033  262 / 262 
Permanent contract 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  0.159*  0.092  285 / 834  0.198*  0.109  262 / 262 
Employment stability 
(Hazard ratio from 
Cox-Regression )  0.693***  0.091  281 / 829  0.798  0.135  259 / 259 
Single nearest neighbor matching, no replacement, caliper 0.005; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  
propensity score matching performed in Stata using psmatch2 (Leuven, Sianesi 2003). 
 
In contrast to monetary outcomes, effects on non-monetary outcomes partly remain 
significant even after controlling for observed covariates. The share of employees IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  17 
who are satisfied with their job is 6.5 percent higher in network jobs than in regular 
jobs. In contrast, persons in network jobs are not more likely to be satisfied with the 
specific tasks in their jobs, and the effect of employment stability in network jobs 
also disappears. Additionally, there is a significant negative effect of 20 percent on 
the likelihood of locating a job with a permanent contract. This finding indicates that, 
at least for some non-monetary outcomes, Hypothesis 2 is supported by the data. 
However, we still must address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. To do so, 
we simulate an unobserved variable and vary its influence on obtaining a network or 
a regular job. The result is shown in Table 3. The second column repeats the causal 
effects from Table 2. Going from left to right, we first simulate a situation with no 
unobserved heterogeneity, which provides the results already reported in Table 2, 
where there are no significant effects on monetary returns and significant effects on 
job satisfaction and permanent contracts. Next, we assume that we have unob-
served heterogeneity of former job seekers in network and regular jobs (reflected by 
variable u in equation 8). This unobserved heterogeneity can be due to unobserved 
abilities that influence wages or to whether employers only offer a fixed-term con-
tract. The heterogeneity might also come from a personal characteristic, such as 
optimism, which can influence job satisfaction. If we assume that such a characteris-
tic has only a small influence on whether job seekers end up in a network job 
(OR=1.1), we see that the p-values for the effect on wages become even larger. As 
far as the non-monetary returns are concerned, the effect on job satisfaction would 
still be significant with a p-value of 0.07, whereas the effect on fixed-term contracts, 
even if initially quite large, becomes insignificant. Under the assumption of a me-
dium influence (OR = 1.2) of the unobserved variable u , the effect on job satisfac-
tion becomes insignificant as well. Unfortunately, because employment stability is 
measured as a right-censured duration variable, the sensitivity analysis is not appli-
cable. 
Because the positive effects of networks on non-monetary outcomes are very sensi-
tive to the influence of unobserved heterogeneity, we must interpret the evidence for 
Hypothesis 2 carefully. The observed differences might reflect causal effects, but if 
there is an important unobserved variable with only a small or medium influence, 
these differences must be regarded as spurious and not causal. Of course, our sen-
sitivity analysis does not inform us as to whether such an important variable exists. 
Regardless, one cannot consider that the evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 is 
very strong. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  18 
Table 3 
Sensitivity test of the causal effects towards unobserved heterogeneity 
  P-values for the causal effect, assuming … 
 
Causal
effect 
… no unob-
served het-
erogeneity 
… a low 
level 
(OR=1.1) of 
unobserved 
heterogene-
ity  
… a medium 
level (OR=1.2) 
of unob-
served het-
erogeneity  
… a high level 
(OR=1.3) of 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Hypothesis 1: Monetary outcome 
           
Monthly gross wages (euro)  23.22  0.405  0.631  0.806  0.911 
Hourly gross wages (euro)  0.738  0.219  0.421  0.627  0.790 
Satisfied with wage (Dummy,  
1 if yes)  0.008  0.465  0.389  0.217  0.108 
           
Hypothesis 2: Non-monetary outcomes  
           
Satisfied with job (Dummy,  
1 if yes)  0.065  0.030  0.070  0.134  0.221 
Satisfied with task (Dummy, 
1 if yes)  0.023  0.281  0.433  0.510  0.375 
Permanent contract (Dummy, 
1 if yes)  0.198  0.046  0.126  0.256  0.418 
Employment stability (Hazard 
ratio from Cox-Regression)  0.798  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Single nearest neighbor matching, no replacement, caliper 0.005; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  
n.a.: not available; p-values calculated in Stata using rbounds (Gangl 2004) for continuous outcomes  
and mhbounds (Becker and Calliendo 2006) for dichotomous outcomes. 
 
In addition to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, our estimation strategy has 
to cope with the aforementioned ambiguity of any effects on wages. The observation 
of no significant difference between wages in network and regular jobs does not 
prove the absence of a causal effect. To address this problem, we conducted a pro-
pensity score matching with a different treatment indicator. The treatment is now 
defined as using networks as a search strategy versus not using them. In this case, 
the control group consists of persons that potentially used any search strategy other 
than networks. Because of the small number of individuals in the control group, we 
had to broaden the calliper to 0.01 for single nearest neighbour matching without 
replacement. Table 4 shows no significant effect for search through networks on 
either hourly or monthly wages. Note that the point estimates are close to zero or 
even negative. This result indicates that using networks as a job search strategy, at 
least for the low-skilled unemployed, does not seem to lead to higher reservation 
wages. The reason for this result can either be that networks do not increase the 
number of job offers for this population or that the number of job offers, contrary to 
job search theory, do not influence reservation wages. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  19 
Table 4 
Unadjusted differences and causal effects of networks on job search outcomes: 
job search via networks (netS) 
  Before matching  After matching 
Unadjusted 
difference 
Standard 
error 
Number of 
treated / 
controls 
Causal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
Number of 
treated / 
controls 
Hypothesis 1: Monetary outcome 
             
Monthly gross wages 
(Euro)  -99.925**  50.563  716 / 146  -37.213  71.297  137 / 137 
Hourly gross wages 
(Euro)  0.082  0.513  713 / 146  -0.002  0.457  137 / 137 
Satisfied with wage 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  0.028  0.040  924 / 183  0.065  0.054  169 / 169 
             
Hypothesis 2: Non-monetary outcomes 
             
Satisfied with job 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  -0.022  0.032  924 / 183  0.012  0.042  169 / 169 
Satisfied with task 
(Dummy, 1 if yes)  -0.022  0.033  924 / 183  0.006  0.042  169 / 169 
Permanent contract 
(Dummy,1 if yes)  0.046  0.109  924 / 183  0.071  0.142  169 / 169 
Employment stability 
(Hazard ratio from 
Cox-Regression) 
0.809  0.110  916 / 182  0.723*  0.139  168 / 168 
Single nearest neighbor matching, no replacement, caliper 0.01; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  
propensity score matching performed in Stata using psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi 2003). 
 
In addition to these effects on monetary outcomes, we also present the effects of a 
job search through networks on non-monetary returns in Table 4. There are no ef-
fects for a job search through networks on any of the non-monetary outcomes, ex-
cept for employment stability. Because significance is indicated merely at the 10 
percent level and because we have no theoretical explanation for this effect, it 
should be interpreted with caution.  
5  Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to test the effect of social networks on the monetary and 
non-monetary outcomes of a job search for formerly unemployed, low-skilled job 
seekers. After controlling for several observed covariates, we found that networks 
had no effects on monetary outcomes such as wages or wage satisfaction. This 
result does not change if we use a sensitivity analysis to take into account the exis-
tence of unobserved differences in reservation wages. Acknowledging Mouw`s 
(2003) warning that finding a job via social networks might be endogenous, we also 
analyse the effect of a search through networks in general instead of focusing on the 
effect of how the accepted job was found. The results from this specification do not 
indicate any significant effects from using social networks on wages. In contrast to 
our theoretical expectations, social networks do not seem to transmit more or faster 
information than a formal job search. This result could be due to the specific situa-
tion of the unemployed in Germany. All of the unemployed in Germany must register 
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ployment agencies also deliver placement services and inform the unemployed 
about job vacancies, more and faster information might flow via this formal channel. 
This hypothesis is consistent with Pellizzari (2010), who argues that social networks 
are only as effective as local employment agencies are ineffective. 
Similar results are found for the non-monetary outcomes of a job search, even if, at 
first, the results from the propensity score matching show significant effects for so-
cial networks on two of our four non-monetary outcomes (job satisfaction and per-
manent contract, but not for task satisfaction and employment stability). A sensitivity 
analysis, however, shows that neither the positive effect on obtaining a permanent 
contract nor the positive effect on job satisfaction is very robust. If we assume the 
existence of unobserved heterogeneity with a small or medium influence, then the 
positive effects disappear. In addition, we took into account the potential endogene-
ity of job finding method by replacing it with job search method. Our results indicate 
that there is no effect of information flow via social networks on either monetary or 
non-monetary outcomes. 
Faced with these results, one might ask why job seekers engage in job searches via 
social networks at all. An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, scholars are discussing other advantages of networks in addition to infor-
mation flow (cf. Sandefur and Lauman 1998). For example, in addition to informa-
tion, influence is discussed as a potentially important mechanism by which networks 
might be helpful in a job search (Lin 1999). However, Davern (1999) as well as 
Davern and Hachen (2006) find no evidence for either the effects of information or 
the effects of influence, at least for the information/influence indicators they used. 
Another mechanism might be connected to social solidarity or social enrichment. For 
example, in their case study, Fernandez et al. (2000) found no evidence for informa-
tional benefits, similar to the results presented here. They did find, however, that 
recruitment via social contacts leads to social enrichment in the work place. They 
also found that employers benefit from their employee`s social networks because 
the pool of applicants is enriched. They even found that using referrals significantly 
reduces screening costs because referrals were more appropriate for the job at ap-
plication. This finding draws attention to the fact that the benefits from searches via 
social networks are not restricted to job seekers alone, but might also, or even pri-
marily, exist for the employing firms (cf. Rebien 2010; Holzer,1996). Indeed, one 
way to look at our results is that job search via social networks mainly measures 
potential effects of networks on information flow. In contrast, job finding via social 
networks measures information flow as well as other mechanisms, for example so-
cial enrichment. Here benefits from social networks can only be realized, if a job 
seeker actually accepts the job found via her network, explaining positive and sig-
nificant effects from job finding via networks that disappear when we switch to job 
search via social networks. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  21 
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Appendix 
Table  
Balancing table for the sample before and after propensity score matching 
   
Accepted job located 
through …     
Variable 
Sample 
(before or 
after  
matching) 
Social  
network 
Formal job 
search 
Standardized 
bias (%)  p-value 
Search effort (number of different search 
strategies used) 
Before   5.98  6,20  -15,90  0,02 
After   6.13  6,05  5,40  0,52 
Job seeker placed ad in a newspaper 
Before   0.12  0,17  -12,80  0,07 
After   0.13  0,13  1,10  0,90 
Asked friends, neighbors, relatives 
Before   0.92  0,81  33,40  0,00 
After   0.91  0,89  5,60  0,46 
Asked caseworker in employment agency 
Before   0.85  0,88  -10,20  0,13 
After   0.87  0,86  2,20  0,80 
Computer search in data base of employ-
ment agency 
Before   0.83  0,87  -11,50  0,09 
After   0.86  0,87  -2,10  0,80 
Unsolicited application 
Before   0.89  0,92  -9,30  0,16 
After   0.90  0,89  2,60  0,78 
Waited for job offer from employment 
agency  
Before   0.44  0,39  10,40  0,13 
After   0.43  0,44  -0,80  0,93 
Ever turned down employment offer  
because wage was too low? 
Before   0.10  0,12  -5,00  0,47 
After   0.11  0,12  -4,90  0,58 
Unemployment duration 
Before   20.13  24,42  -16,20  0,03 
After   20.91  20,70  0,80  0,92 
Unemployment duration (squared) 
Before   911.69  1482,90  -18,50  0,01 
After   974.13  946,85  0,90  0,89 
Unemployment insurance benefit 
Before   0.28  0,23  10,50  0,12 
After   0.27  0,29  -6,10  0,50 
Unemployment benefit 
Before   0.44  0,45  -1,30  0,85 
After   0.45  0,43  3,80  0,66 
No unemployment compensation 
Before   0.14  0,15  -2,40  0,73 
After   0.14  0,13  1,10  0,90 
Social benefits 
Before   0.14  0,17  -8,60  0,22 
After   0.15  0,14  1,10  0,90 
No formal qualification 
Before   0.36  0,33  6,40  0,35 
After   0.36  0,32  7,20  0,41 
Skilled worker/technical training  
Before   0.47  0,47  -0,20  0,98 
After   0.46  0,48  -4,60  0,60 
Vocational training/master/craftsman/ 
technician 
Before   0.17  0,20  -7,60  0,28 
After   0.18  0,19  -2,90  0,74 
Living with partner (married or not married) 
Before   0.29  0,24  12,40  0,07 
After   0.28  0,28  -0,90  0,92 
Children in Household 
Before   1.03  1,14  -9,90  0,16 
After   1.09  1,04  4,50  0,60 
Net household income before employment 
Before   13.30  12,96  4,90  0,48 
After   13.14  13,11  0,50  0,96 
Net household income before employment 
(squared) 
Before   217.79  219,87  -0,70  0,92 
After   213.70  216,27  -0,90  0,90 
West Germany (Ref.: yes) 
Before   0.64  0,62  5,10  0,46 
After   0.63  0,64  -0,80  0,93 
Note: reported p-value is from a test for the equality of means; standardized bias computed as difference in 
means divided by the average between the respective variances of the covariate. There is no critical value but as 
a rule values of below 4-5 can be considered as indicating satisfactory balance (e.g. Caliendo and Hujer, 2006). IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2011  25 
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